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SOUTH AFRICA’S EMERGING BLACK
MIDDLE CLASS: A HARBINGER OF
POLITICAL CHANGE?
ROBERT MATTES*
Department of Political Studies, University of Cape Town, Rondebosch, South Africa
Abstract: While South Africa has seen a signiﬁcant increase in the post-apartheid period in the size
of the Black middle class, the attitudinal consequences of indicators of the middle class, as of 2011,
are inconsistent and modest in size. While they are no more likely to hold democratic values than
other Black South Africans, they are more likely to want the government to secure ‘higher-order’
rather than basic survival needs. They are less likely to identify with the governing African National
Congress and to turn out to vote. They are also less likely to ‘voice’ their concerns by contacting
ofﬁcials or joining in conventional or unconventional forms of collective action. Yet while intra-
racial class differences amongst Black people remain muted, intra-class racial differences amongst
South Africa’s middle class are still substantial. © 2015 The Authors. Journal of International
Development published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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1 INTRODUCTION
While deﬁnitions and estimates of its size differ, most analysts agree that the combination
of a removal of apartheid restrictions and a series of public policy interventions such as
afﬁrmative action and Black economic empowerment has moved a sizable proportion
of Black South Africans into the ‘middle class’. At least since the classic statements of
Seymour Martin Lipset (1959) and Barrington Moore (1966), comparative scholars of
democratization have come to expect that the development and ultimate size of a country’s
middle class will assist the process of democratization because of its unique values,
opinions and political behaviours. Within South Africa, some analysts expect the Black
middle class to prioritize different public policy concerns (Netzhitenzhe, 2014) and to be
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more critical of government performance and less supportive of the governing African
National Congress (ANC) (Everatt, 2013, 2014). Others have argued the exact opposite,
pointing out that the new Black middle class is dependent on clientelist government
policies for their newfound well-being (Southall, 2012, 2014). Still, others have suggested
that the rise of the Black middle class holds out the possibility of a new, cross-cutting
cleavage that unites people of similar classes across the old apartheid divides of race
and ethnicity (Feree, 2011; Everatt, 2013).
But while most analysts agree that a middle class is characterized by a relatively high
level of income, speciﬁc occupations and speciﬁc levels of education, there is little
agreement on precisely what it is about class that produces these effects. Is it differing
material interests and relationships to the means of production (Marx & Engels, 1992)?
Is it the life chances and worldview imparted by certain types of occupations (Weber,
1958)? Is it the physiological security that it entails (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005)? Or is it
the cognitive skills produced by higher education (Dalton, 2013)? Or as in South Africa,
where the Black middle class has rapidly developed very recently, is it simply the effect
of a new generation socialized under democracy, with little memory of the ancient regime
(Mannheim, 1972)?
In this paper, I review differing arguments about how the middle class is supposed to aid
the endurance of democracy. I also review evidence about the growth of South Africa’s
middle class—variously deﬁned. Based on the arguments of both comparative and South
African scholars, I then develop a set of hypotheses that can be tested against available data
from South African Afrobarometer surveys. I ask whether the members of the emerging
Black middle class differ from other Black South Africans in terms of their electoral
behaviours—particularly in their alignment vis-à-vis the dominant ruling ANC—and other
forms of political participation, such as conventional or unconventional collective action. I
also investigate whether they are more critical of government performance, place different
policy demands on government and are more supportive of democracy. Finally, in contrast
to the preceding focus on intra-racial class differences amongst Blacks, I end with a
summary examination of intra-class racial differences amongst South Africa’s middle class
for each of the research questions mentioned earlier.
To anticipate my ﬁndings, there is little evidence that the Black middle class is anymore
supporting of democracy than other Black South Africans, although there are signs that
they are more likely to want the government to deliver ‘higher-order’ goods, such as free
speech and a government that is accountable, rather than basic survival goods, such as
food, water or shelter. They are less likely to identify with the governing ANC. And they
are also more likely to ‘exit’ the democratic system rather than ‘voice’ their concerns by
voting, contacting ofﬁcials or joining with others to achieve political outcomes, whether
through conventional or unconventional forms of collective action. Finally, while intra-
class differences amongst Blacks are modest at best, intra-racial differences between
middle-class Blacks, on one hand, and middle-class White, Coloured and Indian
respondents, on the other, are still substantial. At least for now, the rise of the Black middle
class does not portend a new non-racial dimension in South African politics.
2 THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT
From the time the ANC took political power in 1994, the transformation of the South
African economy has been that party’s overriding policy goal. While economic
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transformation, through the eyes of the ANC, has implied infrastructural development and
economic growth, in general, it has also included the eradication of destitution and
homelessness and the reduction of poverty. More importantly, economic transformation
has also been seen to imply racial redistribution, which from the beginning has meant—
amongst other things—the creation of a new, Black middle class that would not only signal
the accession of Black South Africans to economic power but would also act as a ‘patriotic
bourgeoisie’ and help drive the larger process of development.
As a governing party, ANC thinking about the process of general development has
evolved over time, as articulated in a series of policy documents beginning with the
short-lived expansionist Reconstruction and Development Plan, the sharp shift to the
neo-liberal Growth, Employment and Redistribution plan, and its later evolution to
the Accelerated Shared Growth Initiative. Since 2009, however, there has been far greater
disagreement amongst economic policymakers, with key ministers calling for centralized
planning and a ‘developmental state’ that would put the country on a ‘new growth path’.
Yet throughout the evolving policy rhetoric, there have been important constants to
development policy in practice in the form of building community infrastructure
(electricity, piped water and sewage); building houses and clinics; widening access to free
education, medicine and basic health care; and expanding access to social welfare grants.
There have also been several important constants in government efforts to build a Black
middle class by requiring afﬁrmative action in public service hiring and by encouraging
afﬁrmative action in the private sector by setting demographic employment benchmarks,
targets and timeframes in sector speciﬁc codes of practice and requiring successful bidders
for state contracts to achieve minimum numeric scores in terms of ‘Black economic
empowerment’. Even before these codes were put into place, big businesses—perhaps
anticipating the need to get out in front of the legislative curve—began to engineer a series
of ‘empowerment’ deals that gave emerging Black business persons signiﬁcant shares in
many of the country’s largest corporations.
Some analysts have worried that these forms of largesse would simply cement yet
another strand into the already oversized ANC electoral coalition. Yet declining ANC vote
totals in metropolitan areas in the recent 2014 national elections—especially in
Johannesburg, Pretoria and Port Elizabeth where the vote share of the Democratic Alliance
(DA), whose liberal politics and (mostly) neo-liberal economics have long tied it to the
White middle class, grew by double digits—have generated arguments that better off
Black voters increasingly are less likely to acquiesce in the face of poor service delivery
and corruption (Everatt, 2013, 2014).
3 THE POLITICAL AND THEORETICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE MIDDLE
CLASS
Proceeding from the foundational conclusions of the classic studies of Seymour Martin
Lipset (1959) (‘the more well to do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain
democracy’) and Barrington Moore (1966) (‘no bourgeoisie, no democracy’), a long line
of studies have subsequently corroborated the empirical link between growth, wealth
and democracy. And with very few exceptions (Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, Yard,
2008), most analysts accept that this link is in some way causal (for the most recent
examples, see Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi, 2000; Halperin, Siegle, Weinstein,
2005; Epstein et al., 2006; Norris, 2008; Teorell, 2010). While analysts have been far less
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clear on the possible reasons why factors associated with material wealth facilitate and/or
sustain democracy, one important line of reasoning points to the role of the ‘middle class’.
Two, often overlapping, tendencies characterize attempts to conceptualize and
operationalise the middle class. The ﬁrst approach deﬁnes it simply in terms of its
‘middle-ness’: that is, those people who either occupy the middle strata of the income
distribution in a given country or a middle position between a lower class and an upper
class (e.g. Seekings & Nattrass, 2005, 2014; Bannerjee & Duﬂo, 2008; and Lufeka,
Mabila, Ben Aissa, 2011; Visagie & Posel, 2011). The second sees the middle class as a
discrete category with unique occupations and skills. And many scholars have pursued
both approaches interchangeably. For example, Karl Marx famously saw the ‘petty
bourgeoisie’ of professionals, small traders and shopkeepers as a functional buffer zone
between the poor (proletariat) and the wealthy (capitalists) (Marx & Engels, 1992). And
according to Lipset (1959: 83), economic growth turns ‘the shape of the class stratiﬁcation
structure so that it shifts from an elongated pyramid, with a large lower-class base, to a
diamond with a growing middle class’. Yet it is not immediately clear why the sheer size
of those occupying a middle point on an income distribution is relevant to democracy and
democratic politics per se, unless there is something distinctive and unique to that group as
a discrete category rather than as a middle space on a continuum. Thus, while Marx
described the middle class as a buffer between the proletarians and the capitalists, its real
relevance stemmed from the fact that while its members shared many of the same values
and aspirations of the capitalist class, they did not own the means of production
(Huntington, 1991; Marx & Engels, 1992).
One causal path between the middle class and democracy may pass through the
occupations that are widely associated with this stratum (Weber, 1958). Just as the skills
learned in the factory produce more ‘modern’ values in developing countries (Inkeles,
1969), the skills and expanding life chances acquired in middle-class occupations—
especially business, professions, management and service sector—are said to transform
values: drawing a regular salary, accumulating savings and pension funds and owning
property give middle-class citizens a greater interest in the protection of private property
and in gradual, rather than radical social, economic and political change (Lipset, 1959;
Bannerjee & Duﬂo, 2008). However, a different argument traces the causal path between
the middle-class and pro-democratic values not through occupation per se but through
higher levels of education that stimulate cognitive development and promote civic values
(Lipset, 1959; Huntington, 1961; Dalton, 2013). In the ﬁrst instance, a sizable middle class
provides a critical mass of people who possess the organizational, ﬁnancial, managerial
and research skills to staff the legislatures, ministries, departments and agencies that make
democracy work (see Mattes and Mozaffar, 2011). In the second instance, a sizable middle
class also provides a mass of citizens who make democracy work by supporting and
participating in the institutions of democracy (Lipset, 1959).
A third argument sees both occupation and education as mere markers of a much more
important characteristic of the middle class: that is, sharply lower levels of scarcity and
physiological insecurity. Based on the logic of Abraham Maslow’s (1954) hierarchy of
needs, Ronald Inglehart (Inglehart & Abramson, 1995: Inglehart & Welzel, 2005) argues
that people value that which is in least supply (the ‘scarcity hypothesis’). Thus,
membership in the middle class is less a marker for education as it is of people who
experience relative abundance and physiological security: that is, people who have solved
‘basic needs’ (e.g. food, water and shelter) and ‘middle-order needs’ (e.g. steady
employment, physical safety, health care and old age pensions) and thus come to value
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‘higher-order needs’ such as self-expression, democracy, gender rights and environmental
protection.
However, Inglehart further speciﬁes this argument in a way that has special relevance
for South Africa. While fundamental political values are determined by scarcity or
abundance, values are formed and solidify during the period of late adolescence (the
‘socialization hypothesis’). Thus, the key question in a developing society is not so much
the current size of the adult middle class, but rather the number of people who grew up
under conditions of relative security and afﬂuence. In South Africa, trade union and
Communist Party members often describe the newly wealthy former leaders of the
liberation struggle—ﬁgures such as Trevor Manuel, Cyril Ramaphosa, Tokyo Sexhwale
and Mamphela Ramphele—as ‘sell outs’ and ‘class traitors’.1 However, Inglehart’s theory
predicts that these individuals would have retained the same basic values and policy goals
that they formed as young militants and revolutionaries. A values gap would emerge only
between Manuel et al., on one hand, and their children, on the other: that is, the so-called
‘born free’ generation who have grown-up in middle-class households and attend relatively
privileged schools and universities.
While few South African scholars have explicitly addressed the issue of the new Black
middle class in terms of the survival of democracy, some have begun to focus on its
implications for the quality of democracy and electoral politics in that country. Echoing
Maslow, Joel Netzhitenzhe (2014: 25) has argued that the marginal declines in ANC
victory margins across the country’s metropolitan areas in the recent 2014 election
‘represents [sic] the voice of a middle strata that are dissatisﬁed with speciﬁc issues’.
Though their rise and sustenance depend directly or indirectly on government
policies, they do not rely on state largesse in the form of access to water, electricity,
social grans and other such basic services. And so … other issues such as probity,
ethics, accountability, decency in the conduct of politics … start to assume
prominence in their voting behaviour or even electoral participation.
At the same time, the logic of Albert O. Hirschmann’s (1970) argument in Exit, Voice
and Loyalty might predict that such dissatisfaction would, in fact, lead the middle class to
‘exit’ the formal democratic process rather than ‘voicing’ their displeasure through voting
or through either individual or collective action and instead utilize their skills and ambitions
to achieve their goals outside of the political arena. Yet not all analysts agree that that the
Black middle class will necessarily be hostile to the governing party. Roger Southall
(2012, 2014), for example, argues that successive ANC governments’ use of policy tools
like afﬁrmative action, Black economic empowerment and state development contracts
has drawn the new Black middle class into a ‘state-party-class coalition’ with the ANC.
1Manuel began his political career as a student activist in Cape Town, member of the South African Communist
Party, and one of the leaders of the internal resistance movement, the United Democratic Front. After entering
government in 1995, he became Minister of Treasury and presided over the government’s policy switch to a
neo-liberal structural reform programme. Ramaphosa was originally the head of the National Mineworkers Union
and then became the Secretary General of the African National Congress. Snubbed of the position of Deputy
President in 1994, he left and entered the business world and started Shanduka Group, becoming one of the most
successful businessmen men in South Africa with a net worth, according to Forbes, of $700 million. Sexhwale
was a senior ﬁgure in the South African Communist Party and close conﬁdante of party leader Chris Hani. He
was later Premier of Gauteng Province and after leaving politics also became one of the country’s wealthiest
businesspersons as Chairman of mining conglomerate Mvelapanda Group. Ramphele was an activist in the Black
Consciousness Movement and a close conﬁdante of its leader Steven Biko. After working in civil society and
academia, she left the country to become a Senior Vice President of the World Bank. Since then, she has been
a Director of several different companies and is listed by Forbes as one of the richest women in Africa.
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4 SOUTH AFRICAN TRENDS IN WELL-BEING
Regardless of the policy shifts away from Keynes to Friedman and now apparently back
again, the constants of actual delivery have resulted in major infrastructural achievements.
Access to basic sanitation increased from 50 per cent of the population in 1995, the year
after the country’s ﬁrst non-racial election, to 83 per cent by 2012. Access to a basic level
of piped water went from 60 to 95 per cent of all households over the same period, and the
proportion with access to electricity went from 50 to 86 per cent by 2014 (Presidency,
Republic of South Africa, 2014: 71–72). Approximately 3.7 million subsidized houses
have been built, and the proportion of people in formal housing increased from 64 per cent
in 1996 to 78 per cent in 2011 (Presidency, Republic of South Africa, 2014: 67–68). In
terms of health care, 1500 new clinics and 18 public hospitals were built, and half of the
existing 400 public hospitals were renovated. Primary healthcare services are now
provided free of charge to all people, and the proportion of people who use public clinics
jumped from 45 per cent in 2004 to 60 per cent in 2012 (Presidency, Republic of South
Africa, 2014: 54, 105). In terms of education, the ANC government built, by 2012, 2700
new schools and 84 500 new classrooms. Seventy-eight per cent of students received fee
waivers, resulting in an increase in gross secondary school enrolment from 51 per cent
in 1993 to 89 per cent by 2012, and nine million children received free lunches every
day at school (Presidency, Republic of South Africa, 2014: 47–48, 103). Finally, the
number of people receiving a social grant grew from 2.7 in 1994 to 16 million in 2013
(mostly via the child support grant), and South Africa now spends 3.4 per cent of gross
domestic product on these and similar grants (Presidency, Republic of South Africa,
2014: 45).
But the vast achievements in building infrastructure and widening access to public
services have resulted in only modest improvements in well-being. While the percentage
of people living under various income poverty lines has fallen, real household incomes
have grown only in the top quintile and bottom decile, with trends in the bottom 10th
wholly attributable to the effect of social grants (Bhorat & Van Der Westhuizen, 2010;
Leibbrandt, Woolard, Finn, Argent, 2010; Presidency, Republic of South Africa, 2014:
45–46). Indeed, unemployment increased from 20 per cent in 1994 to 25 per cent in
2013 by the ofﬁcial measure and from 32 to 36 per cent by the expanded deﬁnition
(Donnelly, 2013).
With the contending effects of decreasing employment and increasing social grants,
others qualify of life indicators have shown little overtime movement. Afrobarometer
has developed a valid and reliable module that measures the extent to which people ‘go
without’ a basket of basic necessities, including food, clean water, necessary medical care
and fuel, for home heating or cooking, as well as a cash income (Mattes 2008) (for wording
see Appendix). According to Afrobarometer South Africa surveys conducted between
2002 and 2011, there was a real decrease in the percentages of Black respondents that
report frequent shortages of food. This drop has probably been concentrated amongst
households that receive child support grants, as StatsSA surveys have found an even larger
drop in reported hunger in households with children (Van der Berg, Louw, du Toit, 2007;
Van Der Berg, 2010). All other indicators, however, show trendless variation over that
same period (Figure 1). In corroboration of these data, Kane-Berman (2014) has cited
government surveys that show that while almost 86 per cent are entitled to receive a basic
minimum of free water each month, one-ﬁfth of households say they have gone at least two
consecutive days or longer without water (Kane-Berman, 2014). Thus, while the
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increasing size of the South African welfare state has managed to counter the effects of
increasing unemployment, its limitations have meant that overall levels of lived poverty
have not diminished.
5 ESTIMATES OF SOUTH AFRICA’S EMERGING BLACK MIDDLE CLASS
The clear trend in personal income across the ﬁrst two decades of South African
democracy has been one of stagnation across the bottom four-ﬁfths of the population
(helped in the bottom 10th only by social grants), but growth amongst the top ﬁfth
(Whiteford & Van Seventer, 1999; Budlender, 2000; Bhorat & Van Der Westhuizen,
2010; Leibbrandt et al., 2010). It is this growth that has generated the rapid expansion
of a middle class amongst Black South Africans. While the trends reviewed in the previous
section were driven largely by state investments in infrastructure construction and social
grants, the growth of the middle class has been driven by legislative changes regarding
employment equity (afﬁrmative action) and Black economic empowerment.
Estimates of trends and the absolute size of the Black middle class vary depending on
whether one examines income, class or self-described class identities. The most systematic
longitudinal attempt comes from a recent study of annual household surveys from 1993 to
2012 conducted by researchers at the University of Stellenbosch (Kotze et al., 2013). They
found—using an income standard of R25000 per annum (in 2000 prices, or US$3250)—
that the absolute size of South Africa’s Black middle class grew from 350000 in 1993 to
almost 3 million by 2012. It is of interest that Southall (2012), using a strictly occupational
approach, has come to roughly similar estimates, ﬁnding an increase in the number of
Black South Africans employed in non-manual, white collar occupations growing from
840000 in 1991 to 3.8 million in 2011. In relative terms, this represents a modest, though
still signiﬁcant shift from 1 to 7 per cent of the Black population. Perhaps more
importantly, Kotze et al. (2013) calculate that the Black share of the country’s middle class
(so deﬁned) jumped from 11 to 41 per cent. This implies important shifts in a range of
social phenomena from the nature and preferences of those able to purchase goods and
services like automobiles, houses and insurance or able to send their children to previously
White public and private schools, as well as the composition of the country’s afﬂuent
suburbs. Blacks, for example, now take 53 per cent of all ﬁrst degrees awarded by the
country’s universities (Kane-Berman, 2014) and outnumber Whites in terms of suburban
home purchases (Presidency, Republic of South Africa, 2014: 68).
Researchers from the Stellenbosch group have also calculated an alternative, multi-
dimensional ‘capabilities’ measure consisting of employment; literacy; access to services
such as clean water, sanitation and electricity; and ownership of assets such as stove,
refrigerator, radio and television (McAravey, Burger, Van der Berg, 2013). They then reset
the per capita income threshold so that the overall proportion deﬁned as middle class in
1993 would be the same as that estimated by the capabilities approach (12 per cent).
However, because these two sets are not composed of the same individuals, the proportion
of Blacks that qualify as middle class (so deﬁned) in 1993, using both the income and
capabilities measures, was just 4 per cent but increased to 12 per cent in 2008 (and the
Black share of the middle class expanded from 17 to 45 per cent). However, if one uses
only the capabilities approach, the percentage of middle-class Blacks began at 12 per
cent and increased to 27 per cent (increasing from 32 to 60 per cent of that group)
(McAravey et al., 2013).
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6 DOES THE NEW BLACK MIDDLE CLASS DIFFER POLITICALLY FROM
OTHER BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS?
Thus, whether one uses an income, occupational or capabilities based approach, or some
combination thereof, there appears to have been an exponential expansion of the Black
middle class over the past 20 years, although its precise size and relative growth is far from
clear. Depending on the measure employed, the percentage of Black South Africans who
might be classiﬁed as middle class ranges anywhere from 8 to 27 per cent. And in terms
of its overall economic impact, Black South Africans now comprise anywhere from 40
to 60 per cent of South Africa’s middle class.
But the political impact of this expansion depends greatly on whether the values,
preferences, evaluations and behaviours of the Black middle class actually differ in any
important ways from other Black South Africans. Unfortunately, none of the large
household surveys collected by the South African state, universities or market research
ﬁrms contain the necessary questions about political attitudes and behaviours that would
allow us to examine these arguments. The most recent South African World Values
Survey (2013) is not yet available to the wider scholarly community, and the previous
one (2006) would be too old for our purposes given the rapid and recent rise of the Black
middle class.
We do, however, have access to the 2011 South Africa Afrobarometer survey. It
comprises personal face-to-face interviews, in the language of the respondent’s choice,
with a random, representative, area probability cluster sample of 2400 South Africans aged
18 years and over. The sampling frame consisted of census enumerator areas and was
stratiﬁed by province, rural–urban differences and dominant racial group. Four interviews
each were conducted in 600 enumerator areas that were selected from each stratum with
probability proportionate to population size. The dataset contains responses to a wealth
of questions about a range of attitudes on democracy, political institutions, political parties
and individual political participation that could serve as dependant variables in tests of the
political impacts of class.
In terms of measures of class—the independent variable—our theoretical interest is in
identifying people who do not merely occupy the middle of the income scale between
the extremes of the poor and the rich, but rather who through what they do, their cognitive
skills or their freedom from physiological insecurity may possess a distinctive set of
interests or values that are conducive to democracy. Thus, in order to test the occupational
argument, I would want to be able to identify people in households where the head of
household is fully employed and either does not work for others (business people, self-
employed professionals or commercial farmers) or works for others within the middle
hierarchies of professional and service sector ﬁrms, or public and corporate bureaucracies.
In order to test the cognitive argument, I would want to identify those people who either
have specialized post-secondary educational training or who attended university. And to
test the physiological insecurity argument, I would want to identify those people who have
access to key services and are free from want of basic necessities.
However, while earlier Afrobarometer surveys asked respondents about their own
occupation (though not head of household for respondents who are unemployed,
housewives or dependent students), the question was dropped after 2006.2 However,
2Using comparable earlier surveys carried out by the Institute for Democracy in South Africa and Afrobarometer
surveys from 2000 to 2006, the results indicate an increase in the proportion of Black adults with a business or
professional occupation from 7 per cent in 1997 to 13 per cent in 2006.
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Afrobarometer has continued to ask a standard measure of educational attainment
(measured as the highest level of schooling attained).3 As of 2011, just 8 per cent of
all adult Black respondents told Afrobarometer interviewers that they had any kind of
training or education at a tertiary institution. In contrast, almost half of adult White
respondents (47 per cent) had similar levels of education, although the proportions of
Indian (10 per cent) and Coloured (7 per cent) respondents were roughly equivalent to
Black South Africans (Figure 2).
Finally, the Afrobarometer module on lived poverty discussed previously provides at
least one element of a potential measure of physiological security. But instead of
experiences of shortages of basic necessities, this measure would focus instead on those
respondents who say they ‘never’ go without food, clean water, home cooking fuel or
necessary medical care. In the 2011 survey, 30 per cent of Black respondents said they
‘never’ went without any of these four basic necessities.4 Yet many of these respondents
3While the Institute for Democracy in South Africa/Afrobarometer surveys track a consistent over time increase in
the proportion of adult Black South Africans who have completed high school (from 18 per cent in 1994 to 26 per
cent in 2011), the data show trendless variation (between 9 and 15 per cent) in the proportion of adults that say
they have any tertiary education or have completed an undergraduate university education.
4The percentage of Black South Africans who tell Afrobarometer ﬁeldworkers they ‘never’ go without enough
food, clean water, home fuel for cooking or heating or necessary medical treatment has varied since 2000 between
28 and 26 per cent, but the data reveal no upward trend.
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may still lead relatively precarious lives, obtaining these necessities through basic survival
strategies, rather than through access to modern municipal services and amenities,
especially those who live in rural areas. Thus, we also utilize two recently added question
items on whether respondents have piped water or ﬂush toilets within the household. As of
2011, just one-third of all Black respondents report having piped water (33 per cent) or a
ﬂush toilet (31 per cent) inside their household (as opposed to and within a communal
compound or a facility outside the compound). Putting all of this together, the proportion
of Black respondents who never go without basic necessities and have piped water and a
ﬂush toilet inside their house, comes to just 14 per cent. In contrast, the number of White
adult respondents (78 per cent) who ﬁt the same criteria is seven times higher, and the
proportion of Coloured (49 per cent) and Indian (57 per cent) respondents is three to four
times as high. Overall, one-in-four (25 per cent) South Africans could be regarded as
physiologically secure in 2011 (Figure 2).5
Finally, in order to operationalize the Inglehart conceptualization that combines
socialization and physiological security, I estimate the size of the young middle class, that
is, those South Africans who are likely to have passed through their formative years (14–22)
since the passage of the 1996 Constitution (known in South Africa as the ‘born frees’ and as
of 2011, aged 18–34years) under conditions of physiological security or having attained at
least some post-secondary schooling. This yields an estimate of 7 per cent (physiological
security) and 8 per cent (higher education) of all young Black respondents, the same proportion
as of the overall Black adult population. The ﬁgures for younger White, Indian and Coloured
respondents are also very similar to that of the overall sample (Figure 3).
7 POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES
We now turn to the key question: to the extent that there is now an identiﬁable, though still
relatively small Black middle class in South Africa, what consequences, if any, does this
portend for the process of democratic consolidation in that country, either attitudinally
5Seekings and Nattrass (2014) do not provide a racial breakdown of their estimates of South Africa’s changing
class structure between 1993 and 2008, but they claim that the share of all households in 2008 with a head of
household employed in business, professional and management, self-employed and semi-professional sectors
was 20 per cent (up from 17 per cent in 1993).
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Figure 3. Born free middle class indicators, 2011
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or behaviourally? Using the most recently available Afrobarometer data from 2011, I
create a measure of physiological security (which takes the value of 1 if respondents
‘never’ go without the four basic necessities and have piped water and a ﬂush toilet in
the household, and 0 if otherwise) and a measure of cognitive skills (which takes the value
of 1 if respondents have any kind of post-secondary training or at least some university
education, and 0 if otherwise). And because it is possible that class reﬂects the joint effects
of both (in)security and cognitive skills, I also create a dummy variable that measures the
interaction of these two measures: it equals 1 if a respondent was both physiologically
secure and had some higher education. Finally, in order to test the socializing effect of
having grown-up secure and well-educated, I create an indicator that takes the value of 1
if the respondent is aged 18-34 and is physiologically secure and has any higher education.
I begin by examining a few key bivariate correlations of physiological security and post-
secondary education amongst Black South Africans (Table 1). What this reveals, ﬁrst of
all, is that while the link between post-secondary education and physiological security is
statistically signiﬁcant and positive, it is rather modest (Pearson’s r=0.167). In other
words, these measures appear to tap relatively unique aspects of what one might consider
middle class. The correlations also suggest that those Black South Africans who are
relatively secure in their enjoyment of basic physiological necessities and who have a
post-secondary education are both more likely to be interested in politics and discuss
politics with family and friends (cognitive engagement) and more likely to listen to radio
and television news or read newspapers on a frequent basis (news media use). At the same
time, they are both less likely to live in rural areas (far more so for physiological security).
Perhaps surprisingly, neither measure registers any signiﬁcant differences between men
and women or between the born frees and the older respondents.
The rest of the analysis proceeds in two parts. I ﬁrst employ a series of multiple
regression models to test whether the members of the Black middle class (as indicated
by either physiological security, higher education or combination of the two) or the
younger members of the middle class are indeed more likely than other Black South
Africans to value democracy, prefer different types of policy outcomes, evaluate
government performance more critically, withdraw their support from the governing
ANC or withdraw from democratic politics. In order to ensure that we are tapping the
effects of class per se, and not its other correlates, I control for the simultaneous effects
Table 1. Correlates of class (Black South Africans)
Physiological security Higher education
Physiologically secure
and higher education
Physiological security — 0.167*** 0.412***
Higher education 0.167*** — 0.561***
News media use 0.222*** 0.292*** 0.156***
Cognitive engagement 0.101*** 0.108*** 0.071**
Rural 0.287*** 0.159*** 0.114***
Women 0.023 0.042* 0.033
Born free 0.012 0.060** 0.012
Cells display Pearson’s r correlations and levels of statistical signiﬁcance:
n = 1829
*p< = 0.05,
**p< =0.01,
***p< =0.001.
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of gender, rural/urban status, age, education, cognitive engagement and news media use.
Where the key comparisons in this section are between middle-class Blacks and their
poorer, less educated compatriots, in the second and ﬁnal portions of the analysis, I focus
on all respondents who are physiologically secure and better educated to test whether racial
differences are still signiﬁcant amongst middle-class South Africans.
In the ﬁrst series of models, I test the Lipset argument that middle-class citizens will
have a greater stake in and thus be more supportive of democracy than their working class,
agrarian or unemployed fellow citizens. More speciﬁcally, I employ four different
measures of democratic values. Second, I use the well-developed index of Demand for
Democracy (a four item average index that measures the extent to which respondents
prefer democracy and reject one party rule, military rule and presidential dictatorship)
(Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005). And beyond support for a nominal regime
type, I create a scale that taps Demand for Democratic Institutions (a six-item average scale
that assesses whether people support regular elections, presidential term limits,
parliamentary control of the legislative process, parliamentary oversight of the executive,
opposition party criticism of government and investigative news media). Finally, I use
two single item questions that measure support for two key civil liberties: Support for Free
News Media and Support for Free Association (for full wording and coding of each of
questions, and estimates of scale validity and reliability, see the Appendix). While well-
educated Black people score signiﬁcantly higher on each of these scales, the size of the
impact is very modest: one-ﬁfth of a point on a ﬁve-point scale (0–4) (Table 2). Moreover,
there is no indication that physiologically secure Blacks (those who never go without basic
necessities and have access to piped water and electricity in the household), those
Table 2. Consequences of class for democratic values (Black South Africans)
Demand for
Democracy
(0–4)
Demand for
Democratic Institutions
(0–4)
Support for Free
News Media
(0–4)
Support for Free
Association
(0–4)
Constant 2.956 2.444 2.308 2.710
Physiological
security
0.059 0.034 0.029 0.139
Higher education 0.206* 0.219** 0.192 0.253
Secure* higher
education
0.091 0.166 0.270 0.110
Born free 0.057 0.011 0.093 0.017
Born free* secure*
higher education
0.138 0.298 0.106 0.303
Rural 0.046 0.091* 0.038 0.080
Women 0.042 0.061 0.078 0.003
News media use 0.014 0.021 0.013 0.015
Cognitive
engagement
0.008 0.066** 0.022 0.146***
Multiple r 0.078 0.126 0.056 0.112
Adjusted R
2
0.001 0.011 0.003 0.008
n 1829 1829 1829 1829
Cells display unstandardized ordinary least squares regression coefﬁcients and levels of statistical signiﬁcance:
*p< = 0.05,
**p< =0.01,
***p< =0.001.
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socialized since the end of apartheid, nor any respondent tapped by the middle-class
interaction terms, are more likely to hold democratic values than other Black respondents.
Next, I explore whether materially better-off Black South Africans prioritize different
sets of issues and problems for government action. Afrobarometer asks respondents to
state the three most important issues or problems that they think the government should
address. Following the work of Inglehart (Inglehart & Abramson, 1995; Inglehart &
Welzel, 2005), I group the responses to this open-ended question into a series of dummy
variables indicating basic physiological priorities (e.g. poverty, hunger, disease, water
and housing); economic middle-order priorities (i.e. employment, inﬂation and
inequality); security middle-order priorities (i.e. crime, security and violence); and
higher-order priorities (i.e. corruption, environment, rights and liberties and democracy).
Because the new response categories are coded 0–1, I use logistic regression for these four
models (Table 3).
The results show that well-being does, consistent with the Inglehart theory, make Black
respondents more likely to prioritize ‘higher-order’ needs, such as corruption, speech, civil
liberties or democracy, and less likely to prioritize basic physiological priorities as goals of
government action. Those who are both secure and have higher education are also less
likely to prioritize issues around crime or law and order. However, there are no signiﬁcant
linkages between well-being or higher education and any other priority area. Young Blacks
are less likely to prioritize basic survival needs (although young middle-class Blacks are
more likely) and are more likely to emphasize issues around economic growth and
economic management than are other Black respondents. Thus, the probability that Black
South Africans want the government to focus on securing basic needs, physical security or
Table 3. Consequences of class for issue priorities (Black South Africans)
Basic
physiological
priorities
Economic
middle-order
priorities
Security
middle-order
priorities
Higher-order
priorities
Constant 1.957 1.600 1.383 1.748
Physiological
security
0.447** (0.639) 0.029 (0.972) 0.268 (1.308) 0.591*** (1.805)
Higher
education
0.106 (0.900) 0.418 (1.518) 0.103 (1.109) 0.544 (0.580)
Secure* higher
education
0.413 (0.662) 0.444 (0.641) 1.847* (0.158) 0.718 (2.050)
Born free 0.303* (0.738) 0.490*** (1.632) 0.176 (1.193) 0.139 (0.870)
Born free*
secure* higher
education
1.490* (4.437) 0.352 (0.704) 1.545 (4.688) 0.563 (0.569)
Rural 0.128 (1.136) 0.294 (1.328) 0.482*** (0.618) 0.254* (0.775)
Women 0.404*** (1.498) 0.106 (0.899) 0.094 (0.910) 0.364** (0.695)
News media use 0.142* (0.868) 0.068 (0.935) 0.192*** (1.211) 0.349*** (1.417)
Cognitive
engagement
0.094 (0.911) 0.182* (1.200) 0.004 (0.996) 0.137* (0.872)
Nagelkerke R
2
0.042 0.023 0.050 0.080
n 1829 1829 1829 1829
Cells display unstandardized logistic regression coefﬁcients; levels of statistical signiﬁcance:
*p< = 0.05,
**p< =0.01,
***p< =0.001; and odds ratio.
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higher-order needs is related to their levels of well-being and socialization experiences.
But there are no linkages between class-related factors and the likelihood that people cite
issues around growth, inﬂation, unemployment or inequality (the issues that are most
frequently cited by Black respondents). At least amongst Black respondents, there seems
to be a cross-class consensus around the need for the government to complement the
impressive welfare state that it has created with economic growth, expansion of
employment and keeping prices in check. Job creation, for example, has been routinely
prioritized by anywhere from 60 to 70 per cent of respondents in every survey that has
asked the questions since 1994.
While middle-class Blacks are more likely to prioritize issues of corruption,
governance and democracy as priorities for government action and less likely to want
government to focus on securing basic needs, does this mean that they are more critical
of government performance? To test this, I construct four separate measures of public
evaluations of different aspects of government performance. The ﬁrst three tap the
extent to which respondents think the government is doing well or badly in ‘handling’
issues of macro-economic management evaluations (economic management, job
creation, controlling inﬂation or narrowing inequality); service delivery evaluations
(delivering houses, water, health care, electricity and social grants); or controlling crime
and corruption evaluations (ﬁghting crime and reducing ofﬁcial corruption). I also use a
single item to measure presidential performance evaluations that asks people how well
President Jacob Zuma performed his job over the previous 12months. The results
demonstrate that, amongst Black respondents, neither physiological well-being nor
higher education leads to more negative performance assessment, and in one case
(physiological security and service delivery), the relationship is signiﬁcant and positive.
And younger Black respondents, though not younger middle-class respondents,
consistently offer more positive evaluations across all three policy performance
dimensions (Table 4).
I next test the electoral arguments advanced by Netzhitenzhe (2014) (who has argued
that the middle class have begun to desert the ANC) and Southall (2011) (who argues
that it is becoming more supportive, relative to other voters). I examine whether the
physiologically secure, those with higher education, or the young middle class differs
from other Black respondents in the extent of ANC partisanship (whether or not they
say they ‘feel close’ to the ANC), DA partisanship (whether or not they say they ‘feel
close’ to the liberal DA), voter turnout (whether the respondent voted in the 2009
election) and ANC vote and DA vote (whether those who said they would vote in the
next election would vote for the ANC or the DA ‘if an election were held tomorrow’)
(actual survey question and response wordings are listed in the Appendix). Because
each of these questions items has a dichotomous response choice, I use logistic
regression for these items (Table 5).
In line with the arguments of Netzhitenzhe (2014), Black voters who are
physiologically secure and who have been socialized since the end of apartheid (the
‘born frees’) are both less likely to identify with the ANC. Conversely, while just 1.2
per cent of all Black respondents in the 2011 survey said they ‘felt close’ to the DA
(as opposed to 55 per cent for the ANC), those respondents are disproportionately likely
to have post-secondary education. In terms of voter turnout, younger Black voters are
less likely to say they voted in the previous (2009) election, even after removing those
respondents who were actually too young to have voted. Much of this, however, is
related to the standard cross-national ﬁnding of the negative relationship between youth
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and electoral participation (Norris, 2003). At the same time, Black respondents with
higher education are less likely to say they voted, a ﬁnding that stands in sharp contrast
to the standard relationships found in comparative studies (Norris, 2003). Finally,
younger Black respondents are signiﬁcantly less likely to say they would vote for the
ANC ‘if an election were held tomorrow’. And while just 4 per cent of all Black
respondents said they would vote for the DA (compared with 90 per cent for the
ANC), those few respondents are substantially more likely to come from the Black
middle class. Both physiologically secure respondents and those with higher education
are signiﬁcantly more likely to vote DA, as are younger Black voters. In sharp contrast
to the Southall (2012) argument, there is no evidence in these data that Black economic
empowerment or afﬁrmative action policies are drawing the Black middle class into
even greater support for the ANC (Southall, 2012).
Finally, I examine whether there is any evidence that the new Black middle class is
‘exiting’ from the democratic process (Hirschmann, 1970). I develop ﬁve different
indices of participation beyond voter turnout. I create average scales of campaigning
(the extent to which respondents attended a campaign rally, persuaded others how to
vote or worked for a party or candidate in the 2009 election campaign); joining (the
extent to which respondents are active member of religious or civic associations);
communing (how frequently they attend community meetings or join political action
groups); contacting (how frequently they contact elected representative, party ofﬁcials
or government ofﬁcials); and protesting (how frequently people attend protests and take
part in political violence).
The results show that Black respondents who have secured their basic necessities
are indeed less likely to take part in election campaign activities and to contact elected
ofﬁcials between elections and substantially less likely to take part in forms of
collective action such as communing and protesting, than other Black South Africans.
At the same time, Black respondents with higher education are more likely to take
Table 4. Consequences of class: government performance evaluations (Black South Africans)
Macro-economic
management
(0–4)
Service delivery
(0–4)
Crime and
corruption (0–4)
Presidential
performance
(0–4)
Constant 0.623 1.404 1.043 2.135
Physiological security 0.063 0.155* 0.046 0.125
Higher education 0.112 0.079 0.134 0.087
Secure* higher education 0.010 0.145 0.025 0.176
Born free 0.220*** 0.114** 0.177** 0.064
Born free* secure* higher
education
0.022 0.301 0.086 0.191
Rural 0.268*** 0.043 0.347*** 0.186**
Women 0.017 0.020 0.004 0.013
News media use 0.059** 0.084*** 0.035 0.003
Cognitive engagement 0.176*** 0.099*** 0.106*** 0.183***
Multiple r 0.250 0.215 0.178 0.158
Adjusted R
2
0.058 0.042 0.027 0.020
n 1829 1829 1829 1829
Cells display unstandardized ordinary least squares regression coefﬁcients and levels of statistical signiﬁcance:
*p< = 0.05,
**p< =0.01,
***p< =0.001.
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part in some of these activities (campaign politics and contacting ofﬁcials between
elections). While the born free generation is also less likely to join community
organizations, contact ofﬁcials or take part in community affairs, this appears to be
largely a result of the ageing process rather than class because—with one exception
—the interaction of youth with well-being and higher education has no signiﬁcant
impacts (Table 6).
8 A NON-RACIAL MIDDLE CLASS?
In the preceding analysis, the key comparison was between middle-class Blacks and their
poorer, less educated compatriots. It revealed that physiological security and higher
education often lead to differing attitudes and behaviours, although the effects are far
from consistent and often quite modest in size. But the democratic promise of the
emergence of a Black middle class has been seen to arise not only from the possibility
that it might generate a materialist cleavage amongst Black South Africans—and thus,
amongst other things, reduce the extent to which Blacks vote as a block—but also from
the possibility that it may create a new dimension of political cooperation and consensus
amongst middle-class voters, regardless of how they or their parents used to be
categorized by the apartheid system.
Thus, in the ﬁnal portion of this analysis, I focus only on those respondents (n=731)
who are either physiologically secure or better educated to test whether racial differences
are still signiﬁcant amongst the increasingly pan-racial middle class (of the 731
respondents, in the weighted sample, 47 per cent were Black, 31 per cent were White,
16 per cent were Coloured, and 6 per cent were Indian). I then re-run each of the analyses
discussed earlier amongst this group of respondents with race indicated by a series of
Table 6. Consequences of class: political participation (Black South Africans)
Campaigning
(0–4)
Joining
(0–4)
Communing
(0–4)
Contacting
(0–4)
Protesting
(0–4)
Constant 0.023 0.064 2.364 0.096 0.195
Physiological security 0.140** 0.060 0.517*** 0.152*** 0.195***
Higher education 0.253*** 0.003 0.147 0.156** 0.001
Secure* higher education 0.044 0.046 0.403 0.023 0.016
Born free 0.016 0.094** 0.652*** 0.127*** 0.006
Born free* secure*
higher education
0.304 0.043 0.573 0.048 0.087
Rural 0.047 0.127*** 0.106 0.075** 0.050
Women 0.102*** 0.098** 0.070 0.000 0.026
News media use 0.064*** 0.077*** 0.054 0.049*** 0.067
Cognitive engagement 0.176*** 0.170*** 0.447*** 0.084*** 0.101***
Multiple r 0.341 0.278 0.344 0.290 0.212
Adjusted R
2
0.112 0.073 0.114 0.080 0.045
n 1624 1829 1829 1829 1829
Cells display unstandardized logistic regression coefﬁcients and levels of statistical signiﬁcance:
*p< = 0.05,
**p< =0.01,
***p< =0.001.
South Africa’s Emerging Black Middle Class 681
© 2015 The Authors. Journal of International Development published by
John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
J. Int. Dev. 27, 665–692 (2015)
DOI: 10.1002/jid
dummy variables with Black as the excluded category. The results can be summarized
fairly parsimoniously.
In terms of democratic values, race plays almost no role in differentiating amongst the
attitudes of middle-class South Africans (Table 7). In terms of their issue priorities, White
respondents are signiﬁcantly less likely to emphasize basic necessities and more likely to
Table 7. Intra-class racial differences in democratic values (physiologically secure and educated
respondents)
Demand for
democracy
(0–4)
Demand for
democratic institutions
(0–4)
Support for free
news media
(0–4)
Support for
free association
(0–4)
Constant 2.526 2.464 1.808 2.46
White 0.072 0.066 0.243 0.178
Coloured 0.117 0.007 0.109 0.057
Indian 0.021 0.135 0.165 0.092
Born free 0.086 0.011 0.288*** 0.047
Rural 0.021 0.112 0.147 0.046
Women 0.061 0.023 0.133 0.108
News media use 0.077** 0.033 0.155** 0.064
Cognitive engagement 0.105** 0.029 0.048 0.038
Multiple r 0.204 0.092 0.197 0.088
Adjusted R
2
0.041 0.000 0.028 0.001
n 731 731 731 731
Cells display unstandardized ordinary least squares regression coefﬁcients and levels of statistical signiﬁcance:
*p< = 0.05,
**p< =0.01,
***p< =0.001.
Table 8. Intra-class racial differences in issue priorities (physiologically secure and educated
respondents)
Basic
physiological
priorities
Economic
middle-order
priorities
Security
middle order
priorities
Higher-order
priorities
Constant 0.633 2.065 0.913 0.795
White 0.521** (0.594) 0.440 (0.644) 0.703*** (2.019) 0.649*** (1.913)
Coloured 0.200 (0.819) 0.129 (0.879) 0.278 (1.320) 0.544* (1.740)
Indian 0.328 (1.388) 0.468 (1.596) 0.273 (1.313) 0.459 (0.632)
Born free 0.017 (0.983) 0.104 (0.901) 0.251 (1.285) 0.083 (0.921)
Rural 0.327 (1.386) 0.070 (1.073) 0.303 (0.739) 0.160 (0.852)
Women 0.403** (1.496) 0.080 (0.923) 0.173 (0.841) 0.193 (0.825)
News media use 0.013 (1.013) 0.199 (0.819) 0.129 (1.138) 0.136 (1.146)
Cognitive
engagement
0.058 (1.060) 0.414*** (1.512) 0.089 (0.915) 0.157 (0.855)
Nagelkerke R
2
0.037 0.049 0.051 0.062
n 731 731 713 731
Cells display unstandardized logistic regression coefﬁcients; levels of statistical signiﬁcance:
*p< = 0.05,
**p< =0.01,
***p< =0.001; and odds ratio.
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list issues of crime and security, as well as governance issues of corruption, environment,
political rights and democracy. Middle-class Coloured citizens are also more likely to cite
these ‘higher-order’ priorities (Table 8). More consistent racial effects can be seen when
we turn to evaluations of government performance. With one exception (White
respondents’ views of macro-economic management), White, Coloured and Indian
middle-class respondents are consistently more negative than middle-class Blacks in terms
of their evaluations of government management of the economy, service delivery, and
crime and corruption, as well as presidential performance (with the largest differences
coming with respect to President Jacob Zuma) (Table 9).
Very large racial differences emerge once we turn to issues of partisanship and
voting. As with government performance evaluations, but by a far greater margin,
White, Coloured and Indian middle-class respondents are consistently far less likely
to identify with the ANC or to vote for it and far more likely to identify with the
DA and vote for it. Indeed, the models explaining vote choice in the mock ballot
account for 71 and 64 per cent of the variance, with the three racial dummy variables
doing almost all of the work. In the most extreme example, while physiologically
secure Black respondents were 2.7 times more likely (the odds ratio) to vote for the
DA than poorer Black people (Table 4), the odds of a White middle-class respondent
voting for the DA are 158 times higher than a Black middle-class respondent
(Table 10).
Finally, with a few exceptions, White, Coloured and Indian middle-class respondents
are consistently less likely than middle-class Blacks to have taken part in the 2009 election
campaign, get involved in community politics, contact public ofﬁcials or take part in
political protest. In the most extreme, but by no means atypical example, in comparison
with Black respondents, Whites score a full 1.2 points lower on the 5-point scale of
participation in community politics (Table 11).
Table 9. Intra-class racial differences in government performance evaluations (physiologically
secure and educated respondents)
Macro-economic
management
(0–4)
Service
delivery
(0–4)
Crime and
corruption
(0–4)
Presidential
performance
(0–4)
Constant 0.837 1.921 1.373 2.168
White 0.101 0.272*** 0.390*** 0.679***
Coloured 0.273** 0.255** 0.355*** 0.697***
Indian 0.593*** 0.468*** 0.881*** 1.002***
Born free 0.131 0.084 0.028 0.110
Rural 0.226* 0.018 0.224 0.133
Women 0.013 0.047 0.009 0.018
News media use 0.064* 0.026 0.048 0.071
Cognitive
engagement
0.121** 0.034 0.024 0.089
Multiple r 0.263 0.214 0.228 0.331
Adjusted R
2
0.059 0.035 0.041 0.091
n 731 731 731 731
Cells display unstandardized ordinary least squares regression coefﬁcients and levels of statistical signiﬁcance:
*p< = 0.05,
**p< =0.01,
***p< =0.001.
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9 CONCLUSION
Whether measured by income, occupation, physiological security or higher education, a
sizable proportion of Black South Africans can now be called ‘middle class’. The political
consequences of this development, however, remain limited. Since the end of apartheid, South
Africans have exhibited relatively lukewarm support for their new democratic regime. And the
‘born free’ post-apartheid generation is even less strongly committed to democracy than their
parents or grandparents (Mattes, 2012). Given the theoretical arguments reviewed at the
beginning of this paper, the emerging Black middle class might have been expected to provide
an important constituency that would defend democratic institutions against encroachment.
But as of 2011, Black South Africans who enjoy physiological security or have had access
to higher education do not exhibit sharply different values about democracy, than their poorer
compatriots. Indeed, Black middle-class respondents are more likely to ‘exit’ the democratic
process rather than ‘voice’ their concerns by voting, taking part in election campaigns,
contacting elected representatives and government ofﬁcials or joining with others to achieve
political outcomes, whether through convention or unconventional forms of collective action.
Yet there is evidence that the Black middle class’ preferences for government action
are beginning to diverge from poorer and less well-educated Blacks. As the theory of
post-materialism (Inglehart & Abramson, 1995; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005) would predict,
middle-class Black people are more likely to want the government to secure higher-order
needs of good governance and self-expression and less likely to prioritize securing basic
needs. And while diverging material interests and differing value priorities have not yet
resulted in more critical evaluations of government performance, there are signs that they
are leading to differences in voting behaviour. Black middle-class respondents are less
likely to identify with the dominant, ruling ANC and more likely to say they would vote
for the liberal, historically ‘White’ DA in a future election. Thus, there is little reason to
conclude that, by helping to create a new Black middle class, the governing ANC has bought
itself a new, growing constituency whose loyalty might sustain it if or when it begins to lose
support amongst the homeless and the unemployed.
Table 11. Intra-class racial differences in political participation (physiologically secure and
educated respondents)
Campaigning
(0–4)
Joining
(0–4)
Communing
(0–4)
Contacting
(0–4)
Protesting
(0–4)
Constant 0.112 0.130 1.332 0.008 0.175
White 0.310*** 0.061 1.231*** 0.278*** 0.207***
Coloured 0.207*** 0.115 1.067*** 0.172*** 0.164**
Indian 0.364*** 0.079 1.067** 0.207** 0.155
Born free 0.038 0.110* 0.304** 0.114* 0.001
Rural 0.194** 0.121 0.470*** 0.029 0.199**
Women 0.084* 0.123*** 0.007 0.027 0.076
News media use 0.023 0.069** 0.148** 0.051*** 0.041*
Cognitive engagement 0.155*** 0.120*** 0.501*** 0.100*** 0.082***
Multiple r 0.421 0.251 0.485 0.379 0.294
Adjusted R
2
0.167 0.053 0.227 0.134 0.076
n 655 731 731 731 731
Cells display unstandardized logistic regression coefﬁcients and levels of statistical signiﬁcance:
*p< = 0.05
**p< =0.01
***p< =0.001.
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Yet while many have hoped that the rise of the Black middle class will form a new,
cross-cutting cleavage that unites people of similar classes across the old apartheid divides
of race and ethnicity, racial differences between middle-class Blacks, on one hand, and
middle-class White, Coloured and Indian South Africans, on the other, are still substantial.
Even though the income gap between Blacks and Whites is now smaller than amongst
Black South Africans (Bhorat & Van Der Westhuizen, 2010; Leibbrandt et al., 2010),
there are still far greater racial differences in political participation and to a somewhat
lesser extent political preferences and performance evaluations amongst the middle class
than between middle-class and poorer Blacks. At least for now, the rise of the Black
middle class does not portend a new non-racial dimension in South African politics.
Middle-class South Africans are still far more likely to deﬁne their interests based on the
deep history of apartheid rather than their current material status. In other words, class
is still a nascent factor in South African politics.
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APPENDIX
QUESTION WORDING FOR INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Table 1. Correlates of class
Physiological security
Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family:
Gone without enough food to eat?
Gone without enough clean water for home use?
Gone without medicines or medical treatment?
Gone without enough fuel to cook your food?
(1 = never, 0 = just once or twice, several times, many times, always, do not know)
Post-secondary Education
What is the highest level of education you have completed?
[1 = post-secondary qualiﬁcations other than university (e.g. a diploma or a degree from a polytechnic or a
college), some university, university completed, post-graduate; 0 = no formal schooling, informal schooling only,
some primary schooling, primary school completed, some secondary school, secondary school completed]
News media use
How often do you get news from the following sources:
Radio
Television
Newspapers
Internet
(0 = never, do not know, 1 = less than once a month, 2 = a few times a month, 3 = a few times a week, 4 = every day)
Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 1.70), which explains 42.4% of the common
variance. Index reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.54) is low but above minimum standards for cut off (n = 2400).
Cognitive engagement
How interested would you say you are in public affairs?
(0 = not at all interested/do not know, 1 = not very interested, 2 = somewhat interested, 3 = very interested)
When you get together with your friends or family, would you say you discuss political matters?
(0 = never/do not know, 1.5 = occasionally, 3 = frequently)
The items measuring political interest and political discussion are sufﬁciently correlated (Pearson’s r = 0.45) and
reliable (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.62) to warrant the creation of a two-item average of cognitive engagement (n = 2400).
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Table 2. Consequences of class for democratic values
Demand for democracy
Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion?
Statement 1: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.
Statement 2: In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable.
Statement 3: For someone like me, it does not matter what kind of government we have
Do not know
(0 = statement 3/do not know, 2 = statement 2, 4 = statement 1)
There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives?
Only one political party is allowed to stand for election and hold ofﬁce.
The army comes in to govern the country.
Elections and Parliament are abolished so that the President can decide everything.
(0 = strongly approve, 1 = approve, 2 = do not know, 3 = disapprove, 4 = strongly disapprove)
Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 2.05), which explains 51.1% of the common
variance. Index reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.67) is acceptable (n = 2400).
Demand for democratic institutions
Statement 1: We should choose our leaders in this country through regular, open and honest elections.
Statement 2: Because elections sometimes produce bad results, we should adopt other methods for choosing this
country’s leaders.
Statement 1: Parliament should ensure that the President explains to it on a regular basis how his government
spends taxpayers’ money.
Statement 2: The President should be able to devote his full attention to developing the country rather than
wasting time justifying his actions.
Statement 1: The news media should constantly investigate and report on government mistakes and corruption.
Statement 2: Too much reporting on negative events, like government mistakes and corruption, only harms the country.
Statement 1: Members of the Parliament represent the people; therefore, they should make laws for this country,
even if the President does not agree.
Statement 2: Because the President represents all of us, he should pass laws without worrying about what the
Parliament thinks.
Statement 1: The constitution should limit the President to serving a maximum of two terms in ofﬁce.
Statement 2: There should be no constitutional limit on how long the President can serve.
(0 = agree very strongly with statement 2, 1 = agree with statement 2, 2 = agree with neither/do not know,
3 = agree with statement 1, 4 = agree very strongly with statement 1)
Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 1.74), which explains 34.8% of the common
variance. Index reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.53) is low but above minimum standards for cut off (n = 2400).
Support for free association
Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose statement 1 or statement 2.
Statement 1: Government should be able to ban any organization that goes against its policies.
Statement 2: We should be able to join any organization, whether or not the government approves of it.
(0 = agree very strongly with statement 1, 1 = agree with statement 1, 2 = agree with neither/do not know,
3 = agree with statement 2, 4 = agree very strongly with statement 2)
Support for free news media
Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose statement 1 or statement 2.
Statement 1: The media should have the right to publish any views and ideas without government control.
Statement 2: The government should have the right to prevent the media from publishing things that it considers
harmful to society.
(0 = agree very strongly with statement 2, 1 = agree with statement 2, 2 = agree with neither/do not know,
3 = agree with statement 1, 4 = agree very strongly with statement 1)
Table 3. Consequences of class for issue priorities
Basic physiological priorities
In your opinion, what are the most important problems facing this country that the government should address?
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(1 = poverty/destitution, farming/agriculture, food shortage/famine, drought, land, housing, electricity, water
supply, orphans/street children/homeless children, health, aids, sickness/disease, agricultural marketing; 0 = all
other answers)
Economic security middle-order priorities
In your opinion, what are the most important problems facing this country that the government should address?
(1 =management of the economy, wages, incomes, salaries, unemployment, rates, taxes, loans, credit,
transportation, communications, infrastructure, roads, education, services (others); 0 = all other answers)
Physical safety middle-order priorities
In your opinion, what are the most important problems facing this country that the government should address?
(1 = crime, security, political violence, political instability, political divisions, ethnic tensions, war (international),
civil war; 0 = all other answers)
Higher-order priorities
In your opinion, what are the most important problems facing this country that the government should address?
(1 = corruption, discrimination/inequality, gender issues/women’s rights, democracy/political rights; 0 = all other
answers)
Note: The theory of measurement underlying these indices is not based on the concept of covariance. The
response categories were open-ended. And while the number of problems mentioned by the total sample is
very large, each respondent was able to mention only three. Thus, I do not necessarily expect those who
choose one type of problem will necessarily choose other problems of the same conceptual area. What is
desired is a simple indication of whether a respondent mentioned a type of problem as one of the three
response.
Table 4. Consequences of class for government performance evaluations
Macro-economic management
How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven’t you heard
enough to say?
Managing the economy
Creating jobs
Keeping prices down
Narrowing gaps between the rich and the poor
(0 = very badly, 1 = badly, 2 = do not know/haven’t heard enough, 3 =well, 4 = very well)
Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 2.41), which explains 60.3% of the common
variance. Index reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.78) is high (n = 2400).
Service delivery
How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven’t you heard
enough to say?
Improving the living standards of the poor
Improving basic health services
Addressing educational needs
Providing water and sanitation services
Ensuring everyone has enough to eat
Combating HIV/AIDS
Maintaining roads and bridges
Providing a reliable supply of electricity
(0 = very badly, 1 = badly, 2 = do not know/have not heard enough, 3 = well, 4 = very well)
Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 3.66), which explains 45.8% of the common
variance. Index reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.85) is high (n = 2400).
Controlling crime and corruption
How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven’t you heard
enough to say?
Reducing crime
Fighting corruption in government
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(0 = very badly, 1 = badly, 2 = do not know/haven’t heard enough, 3 = well, 4 = very well)
The items measuring approval of crime and corruption are sufﬁciently correlated (Pearson’s r = 0.49) and
reliable (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.66) to warrant the creation of a two-item average of controlling crime and
corruption (n = 2400).
Presidential performance
Do you approve or disapprove of the way that President Jacob Zuma the following people have performed their
jobs over the past 12months, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say?
(0 = very badly, 1 = badly, 2 = do not know/haven’t heard enough, 3 = well, 4 = very well)
Table 5. Consequences of class for partisanship, turnout and vote choice
Partisanship
Do you feel close to any particular political party?
(1 = yes; 0 = no, do not know)
ANC partisanship
Do you feel close to any particular political party? If yes, which party is that?
(1 = African National Congress; 0 = all other parties, do not feel close to a party, do not know)
Voter turnout
With regard to the most recent national election in 2009, which statement is true for you?
(1 = you voted in the elections; 0 = you were not registered or you were too young to vote, you decided not to vote,
you could not ﬁnd the polling station, you were prevented from voting, you did not have time to vote, you did not
vote because you could not ﬁnd your name in the voters’ register, you did not vote for some other reason, do not
know)
ANC vote
If a national election were held tomorrow, which party would you vote for?
(1 = African National Congress 0 = all other parties, would not vote, do not know)
Table 6. Consequences of class for political participation
Campaigning
Thinking about the last national election in [20xx], did you:
Attend a campaign, a meeting or a rally?
Try to persuade others to vote for a certain presidential or legislative candidate or political party?
Work for a candidate or party?
(0 = no, do not know; 1 = yes)
Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 1.82), which explains 60.6% of the common
variance. Index reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.67) is acceptable (n = 2400).
Joining
Now, I am going to read out a list of groups that people join or attend. For each one, could you tell me whether
you are an ofﬁcial leader, an active member, an inactive member, or not a member?
A religious group that meets outside of regular worship services
Some other voluntary association or community group
(0 = not a member, do not know; 1 = inactive member; 2 = active member; 3 = ofﬁcial leader)
The items measuring membership in religious groups and voluntary associations are sufﬁciently correlated
(Pearson’s r = 0.45) and reliable (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.61) to warrant the creation of a two-item average of joining
(n = 2400).
Communing
Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you,
personally, have done any of these things during the past year.
Attended a community meeting
Got together with others to raise an issue
(0 = no, would never do this; 1 = no, would if had the chance; 2 = yes, once or twice; 3 = yes, several times;
4 = yes, often)
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The items measuring community meetings and raising issues are sufﬁciently correlated (Pearson’s r = 0.70) and
reliable (Cronbach’s alpha = 82) to warrant the creation of a two-item average of communing (n = 2400).
Contacting
During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons about some important problem
or to give them your views?
A local government councillor
A member of Parliament
An ofﬁcial of a government agency
A political party ofﬁcial
(0 = never, do not know; 1 = only once; 2 = a few times; 3 = often)
Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 2.64), which explains 66.1% of the common
variance. Index reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.69) is acceptable (n = 2400).
Protesting
Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you,
personally, have done any of these things during the past year.
Attended a demonstration or a protest march
Used force or violence for a political cause
(0 = no, would never do this; 1 = no, would if had the chance; 2 = yes, once or twice; 3 = yes, several times;
4 = yes, often)
Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 2.00), which explains 66.8% of the common
variance. Index reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.73) is high (n = 2400).
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